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EDITOR'S NOTE
Subsequent to the completion of this article, the Securities and
Exchange Commission adopted Rule 19c-4 under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. The new Rule formalizes a unified standard
among the exchanges regarding the listing of public companies that
issue securities, or take other corporate action with the effect of dis-
parately reducing the per share voting rights of its existing common
stock. Therefore, readers should be aware that some of the recapi-
talization schemes analyzed in this article are now prohibited by
Rule 19c-4.
THE EFFECT OF DUAL CAPITALIZATION ON THE
SHAREHOLDER: VOTING RIGHTS COME FULL
CIRCLE
Andrew D. Simons*
I. INTRODUCTION
The dramatic surge in hostile takeover activity in recent years
has profoundly affected traditional notions of corporate governance.'
In the wake of the raider-arbitrager blitz, directors have scurried to
shield their corporations and respective positions by adopting one of
the many anti-takeover devices available. Yet shark repellents and
"lock up" provisions, the remedies that initially seemed so promis-
ing, have begun to backfire with disturbing frequency.' Directors
O 1988 by Andrew D. Simons
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1. For a general discussion of the increase in merger activity, see Matheson & Norberg,
Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework For Evaluating An-
titakeover Activities, 47 U. PirrT. L. REV. 407, 411-15 (1986) ("Since 1975, there have been
more than fifty billion-dollar mergers or acquisitions, with over one-half of these occurring
since the beginning of 1984. In 1984 alone, there were nearly 3,000 mergers or acquisitions,
the highest total in more than a decade."). See also Sloan, Why is No One Safe?, FORBES,
Mar. 11, 1985, at 134; 1985 Profile, Mergers & Acquisitions, May-June 1986, at 45.
2. See Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal For Reform, 36 HASTINGS L.
J. 377 (1985). The term "shark repellants" refers to provisions that potential targets imple-
ment to deter hostile takeovers. The provisions take a variety of forms but seek the same result
of rendering the company less vulnerable to takeover by amending the corporation's bylaws or
charter. Because they make a company less attractive as a target, they "repel" takeover
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still lose the fight in the end to the more innovative and determined
bidder,8 or face a shareholder derivative suit for mismanagement or
squandering corporate assets.4 But the raider has definitely lost the
element of surprise that made the early kills so easy.5 As a more
seasoned corporate management armors itself in defensive shells that
appear impenetrable, the momentum continues to shift. In fact, the
newest vogue in defensive planning, dual class recapitalization,"
seems to offer directors the machinery they have been searching for
to permanently neutralize the hostile bidder. By amending the corpo-
ration's certificate of incorporation, directors can recapitalize their
equity structures to create dual classes of common stock with dispa-
"sharks." Pitt, Hurwitz & Peters, Tender Offers: Offensive and Defensive Tactics and the
Business Judgement Rule, in 1 HOSTILE BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 7 (1987).
Lock up options, actually a subcategory of the shark repellant heading, are also manifested in
a variety of ways. The aim remains consistent, however, namely to discourage takeover at-
tempts. Id. at 202. The poison pill defense generally involves a shareholders' rights plan that
allocates "flip in" rights that are activated by a triggering event like a tender offer. Once
activated, the right gives the holder the option to buy shares of the tender offeror or acquiring
corporation. Again, the central idea is to deter hostile bidders by rendering the target a difficult
acquisition to digest. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del.
1985) (target issued rights to its shareholders which allowed them to acquire shares of success-
ful tender offeror at half price).
3. See generally Tender Offers, supra note 2.
4. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding v. Revlon, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (Delaware
Supreme Court held that the Revlon board's decision to grant a lock up option to a white
knight during the pendency of a hostile bid was not protected by the business judgment rule).
But see Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (business judgment rule vindi-
cates defensive maneuvering by target's board). Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, 634 F.2d 690
(2d Cir. 1980) (directors entering into merger agreement to prevent hostile takeover protected
by business judgment rule). Notwithstanding management's ability to win these suits under the
permissive business judgment rule, the litigation is a tedious process that often leaves perma-
nent scars on the respective parties.
5. For an interesting perspective of the merger mania that brought enormous profits to
several investors who pioneered the hostile tender offer process, see I. BoESKY, MERGER
MANIA (1985). The Williams Act originally required a minimum of seven calendar days be-
tween the time a tender offer was publicly announced and its deadline or expiration (twenty
days are presently required). Bidders could therefore drastically reduce management's ability
to respond to a tender offer by announcing the offer on Saturday evening. The "Saturday
Night Special" was tantamount to a surprise attack as targeted corporate managers frequently
became aware of the bid only after reading about it in Monday's paper. Id. at 81.
6. For a thorough analysis of the history and mechanics of dual class capitalization, see
Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote
Controversy, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986).
Few takeover defenses are more likely to be successful than dual class capitali-
zation. In a typical dual class capitalization, insiders receive common stock with
multiple votes per share; public stockholders receive shares with one vote per
share. Dual class capitalization thus permits the insiders to control a majority of
votes of a corporation while owning a small minority of its stock. With a major-
ity of votes in hand, their corporation will not be a takeover target.
Id. at 687.
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rate voting rights. The procedure operates to consolidate voting con-
trol over the corporate entity in the hands of management, thereby
discouraging a potential bidder's attack. The scheme obviously serves
the target corporation very nicely; by undergoing a simple restruc-
turing, management can effectively tighten its control and chill
would-be aggressors without any additional expenditure.'
Yet dual class capitalization is not without a downside.' Critics
argue that the procedure expressly repudiates the inveterate princi-
ples of corporate democracy and shareholder participation that hold
such an esteemed position in American corporate law.' In short, the
practice of disenfranchising shareholders from their voting rights
threatens corporate governance with a return to the fraud and deceit
that ravaged the 1920's. At the very least, it insulates directors from
all foreseeable shareholder pressure. Since the debate surrounding
the tender offer remains active, the propitiousness of permitting in-
fallible defensive mechanisms like the dual class capital structure can
be forcefully argued both pro and con. Certainly, as directors con-
tinue to restructure their corporations, the procedure will come
under increased scrutiny.' ° At issue, and of primary concern to the
regulators" that must evaluate the scheme (Congress and the Securi-
7. Dual class capitalization must be distinguished from initial capitalization or a "public
offering" involving the issuance and sale of new shares. Although any shareholder vote runs up
a significant bill for a corporation, the costs of recapitalization are minimal in comparison to
expenses associated with greenmail and self tender options. See generally Tender Offers, supra
note 2.
8. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
9. The case against defensive and anti-takeover tactics is lead by Easterbrook and Fis-
chel. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Commentators adopting the
same basic premises include Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
10. Dual class capitalization has attracted considerable attention recently as the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) is currently considering the New York Stock Ex-
change's (NYSE) proposal and has hinted at the possibility of creating a listing standard that
will apply to all exchanges. See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 196-4, Pro-
posed Rules Changes by New York Stock Exchange, Inc. September 16, 1986; One Share, One
Vote Controversy Comes to a Head in SEC Hearings, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1986, at 30, col. 5;
See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
11. Corporate capitalization structures have traditionally been regulated by state law
which is restricted only to the extent that it might be preempted by federal law. The phrase
"regulators," refers to those entities that directly or indirectly effect changes in the law regard-
ing corporate governance. An interesting example of Congress' indirect impact on this rule
making process can be seen in the Exchanges' reaction to Senator D'Amato's proposed legisla-
tion on the one-share, one-vote issue which threatened to forever end the debate. The NYSE,
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities Dealers(NASD) quickly initiated discussions to resolve the problem themselves. Although they were
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ties and Exchange Commission), are the rights of shareholders. A
determination that corporations with dual class structures signifi-
cantly violate permissible standards of corporate governance will un-
doubtedly undermine its legitimacy and quicken its demise. The one-
share, one-vote model would thus become dispositive in terms of ac-
ceptable forms of corporate capitalization and governance.12 Con-
versely, a finding that the dual class system neither imperils the
shareholders' position nor alters their participatory behavior will
help to vindicate it as a reasonable practice."3 Ultimately, a middle
ground may emerge as these polarized extremes collide in judicial
interpretations that permit a modified form of dual class capitaliza-
tion. Some shareholder plans that have recently surfaced appear to
fit that role.
The debate over stock with unequal voting rights raises no sub-
stantive issues that have not already been addressed in the last 100
years of evolving corporate law.' But the issues in the present dia-
logue acquire a new meaning when viewed against the backdrop of
the recent hostile takeover whirlwind. While the central discussion in
the past focused on the need to stem corporate deceit and misrepre-
sentation,' 5 the emphasis of the current dilemma lies in balancing
the interests of the parties engaged in the battle for corporate control.
At present, the equation seems to be stacked against management. A
multitude of creative financing and takeover plans such as the two-
tier tender offer' financed by "junk bonds"' 7 has substantially im-
ultimately unable to do so, their actions shed light on how corporate law and policy come
about. See 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 12, at 389 (Mar. 21, 1986).
12. The NYSE has maintained a "one share, one vote" rule that prohibits the listing of
any shares of a company that has outstanding more than one class of common stock or stock
with restrictions on voting power since 1926. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 313.00 (1985). The proponents of the one-share, one-vote regime are lead by T.
Boone Pickens, Jr. See Pickens, Second-Class Stock Impairs Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 13,
1986, at 24, col. 4. See also Note, Dual Class Capitalization and Shareholder Voting Rights,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1987) (arguing that the business judgment rule operates to make the
recapitalization process impermissible).
13. Several articles have been written that approve of dual class recapitalization with
specific qualifications. See Seligman, supra note 6; Herzel & Katz, Investors Can Weigh Vot-
ing Rights, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1986, at 24, col. 6. For a general discussion of both sides of
the argument regarding restricted shares, see Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Lim-
ited Voting Common Shares-Their History, Legality, and Validity (Part II), 15 SEC. REG.
L.J. 165 (1987).
14. See Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common
Shares-Their History, Legality, and Validity, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 34, 48-50 (1987); Berle,
Nonvoting Stock and Bankers' Control, 39 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1926).
15. Loomis & Rubman, Corporate Governance In Historical Perspective, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 141, 149-58 (1979).
16. The two-tier tender offer or front loaded takeover begins when a bidder pays a high
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proved the bidder's position. Every corporation comprised of liquid
assets, coveted raw materials, or undervalued stock potentially be-
comes a target and can be acquired overnight by a carefully orches-
trated takeover plan. Thus, successful implementation of an efficient
and effective anti-takeover device seems to offer management its only
chance for survival, regardless of its track record." Because the pop-
ularity of dual class capitalization stands to grow significantly in the
years ahead, the dangers it harbors for the law of corporate govern-
ance must be resolved now.
This article examines the impact that dual class capitalization
has upon shareholders' rights and the extent to which the process
disrupts traditional modes of corporate governance. By documenting
the nature of corporate suffrage before and after the arrival of the
hostile bidder, it can be shown that dual class capitalization actually
brings shareholder voting full circle. In other words, historically
speaking, ownership in a corporation does not translate into a corre-
sponding proportion of control. Instead, shareholders defer decision-
making authority to management. But the hostile bidder has inter-
rupted that dynamic by purchasing stock for its voting power. Dual
class capitalization, it can be argued, merely returns shareholder vot-
ing to the symbolic status that it enjoyed prior to the boom in tender
offer activity.
premium in a partial bid for fifty-one percent of the target's stock. The bidder then effectuates
a merger or acquisition of the remaining shares at a price below what they sold for prior to the
tender offer. See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment
of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1166-73
(1984). A noteworthy example of two-tier takeover is U.S. Steel's successful offer for fifty-one
percent of Marathon Oil in 1981 for a cash price of $125 per share. U.S. Steel later acquired
the remaining forty-nine percent of Marathon in a subsidiary merger that cost approximately
$86 per share. Thus the average price paid for each share was $105.50.
17. Junk bonds are high-yield subordinated debt that offer bidders quick capital in large
amounts. Brokerage houses played a key role in the budding popularity of junk bonds fre-
quently engineering takeovers through their ability to rally needed resources in a hurry. See H.
BENJAMIN & M. GOLDBERG, LEVERAGED AcQuISsrIoNs AND BUYOUTS (1987); Two Tier
Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs-Advance Notice of Possible
Commission Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21,079 [Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,637 (June 21, 1984). Sometimes the junk bonds are issued by a corporation that
will have no assets prior to acquiring the target. See Carney, Junk Bonds Don't Merit A
Black-Hat Image, Wall. St. J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 24, col. 3.
18. While a primary justification for the tender offer lies in the purging effect it has
upon inefficient management, recent commentary suggests that the hostile tender offer wave
increasingly swallows efficient and lucrative management. Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in
Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 289-94 (1983). In
addition, tax law, rather than the inefficiency of a particular board, often supplies the incentive
for takeovers. Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 759-64 (1985).
For other incentives, see infra notes 74-75.
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Yet the analysis cannot end without a more incisive investiga-
tion into the future of corporate America if dual class capitalization
becomes a pervasive norm. Indeed, a distinction must be drawn be-
tween an uncast vote and no vote at all. If the dormant power that
emanates from unused votes actually influences managerial decisions,
then permanently neutralizing shareholder voting might be an
overly-potent remedy.
Part I of this article traces the history of shareholder voting and
participation to expose the ideal of corporate democracy 9 as a fic-
tional concept. Part II studies the metamorphosis experienced by
corporate law as a result of the hostile tender offeror, arguing that
voting shares have suddenly acquired meaning as bidders begin to
vote their shares to oust management or consummate a merger. Part
III evaluates corporate governance under the dual class capitalization
structure, demonstrating that its practical effect engenders no signifi-
cant change in the relationship shareholders have with their corpora-
tions. Part IV considers the deeper effects that the elimination of
shareholder voting might have upon management's perspective of its
responsibility and duty to the corporate entity. It suggests that a
modified form of recapitalization might be the more equitable way to
balance this currently unbalanced situation.
II. THE FICTION OF CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
One primary stumbling block for the dual class capitalization
scheme lies in the very profound impact it has upon shareholders'
voting rights. 20 In no uncertain terms, the procedure severs the
shareholder from the voting power naturally flowing from stock
ownership. A controlling group within the corporation gains hold of
voting shares from other owners who relinquish their right to influ-
ence the decision-making process or direct the company in exchange
for dividend priority or freedom of transferability. 2' The shift of con-
trol into the hands of a few seems to violate the principles of democ-
racy that, in theory, underpin traditional corporate law and govern-
19. The forces that operate in the corporate democracy equation have been extensively
treated by several authors. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
(1976); R. LARNER, MANAGEMENT CONTROL AND THE LARGE CORPORATION (1970); G.
MEANS, THE CORPORATE REVOLUTIONS IN AMERICA (1962).
20. See, e.g., Impact of Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securi-
ties of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
1110-234 (1985).
21. See generally Seligman, supra note 6.
[Vol. 28
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ance structures.2" Yet, as the corporate law scholars Bearle and
Means have extensively documented, the ideal of corporate democ-
racy has no foundation in reality.
Under the perfect model of corporate democracy, each corpora-
tion is ultimately governed by its shareholders who command au-
thority in proportion to the size of their ownership interest.23 The
corporation obtains its initial capital through the public offering,
which generates the shares and distributes the right to control ac-
cordingly.2 ' Thus, the shareholders have rights to dividends and liq-
uidation value (should that event occur), in addition to their voting
powers. The model works well on a small scale, in a closely-held
corporation, for example, where the majority shareholder is often the
business' founder and president and therefore exercises total control
over the company's direction and affairs.25 But the nature of the
public corporation makes the same ideal unobtainable.
Traditionally, large corporations necessarily have found it diffi-
cult or impossible to function where every decision must be resolved
by a multitude of owners literally scattered across the world. As
enormous corporations began to take root in the economy, an en-
trusted management emerged that controlled day-to-day and long-
term activities."5 In turn, shareholders assumed the characteristics of
"investors," unconcerned with their corporation's management and
direction, provided their initial purchase yielded a favorable return.
As one author identified the problem in 1936,
[bly their own practices, [shareholders] are more nearly lenders
to the business than owners of it. They exhibit more interest in
dividends than in policies. They do not attend meetings, nor do
they exercise the privilege of voting by proxy, or, . . . the privi-
22. Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes : Reflections on Corporate Governance and
Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183, 193-99 (1979-80); A. BERLE & G. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 123-30 (rev. ed. 1967). Early corpo-
rate charters required strict compliance with a rigid set of provisions, all designed to promote
equality and fairness in the corporate structure. Proxy solicitations were prohibited ensuring
full shareholder participation and directors could be voted out at the shareholders' will. Fur-
ther, the unanimous consent of shareholders was required before the management could imple-
ment certain policies. As a result, the business could not undergo any significant change with-
out full shareholder approval.
23. A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1967), supra note 22, at 130.
24. A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1967), supra note 22, at 47-56. See also H. BLOOMEN-
THAL & S. WING, SECURITIES LAW §§ 6.01-6.16 (1985-86).
25. Because of the unique nature of the closely-held corporation, statutory and judicial
exceptions have been adopted by several states. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 385-407 (3d
ed. 1986).
26. A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1967), supra note 22, at 78-84.
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lege of executing a proxy. In consequence of this apathy and
inertia on the part of small investors, annual meetings must
sometimes be adjourned.2"
The divorce between stock ownership and corporate control
never aroused the type of controversy or public outcry that might
have provoked legislative regulations or change."8 Shareholders sim-
ply did not perceive their investment as a claim to corporate author-
ity. Instead, the purchase of shares, especially in the secondary mar-
ket, seemed to be governed by an assumed contract whereby the
owners accepted existing management and its ability to operate the
company with efficiency and expertise.29 The remedy always availa-
ble to disgruntled shareholders was a sale of their holdings. Thus, as
corporations rapidly expanded beyond the financial parameters of
their initial capitalization, the shareholder became further and fur-
ther removed from a position of managerial authority. s The con-
comitant transformation of the shareholder into an investor sealed
the disenfranchisement. In 1931, Berle described the then current
norm of corporate governance as follows:
The stockholder has changed his position in American financial
life so radically that the old rules no longer apply. Originally he
was supposed to be a kind of modified partner in a small enter-
prise . . . able to take care of himself, and to take active part in
the counsel of his corporation. During the past generation this
27. R. STEVENS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 454 (1936).
28. Professor William Z. Ripley of Harvard spearheaded the campaign against non-
voting stock in the mid-1920's and his efforts were not in vain. His well-known message was
published as a book entitled W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) and gen-
erated debate and attention to problems concerning corporate abuse. See also R. SOBEL, THE
BIG BOARD: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 236 (1965). See supra note
14 and accompanying text.
29. See generally Loomis & Rubman, supra note 15; Hetherington, supra note 22, at
184-86.
30. Hetherington, supra note 22, at 184 ("[A fact] about shareholders and managers of
publicly held companies on which commentators of all shades of opinion agree . . . is the
existence of the separation of ownership and control . . . . [I]t is generally agreed that . . .
shareholders of publicly held companies play an entirely passive role in the election of
directors.").
Our corporation statutes assume that shareholders own the corporation, that the
powers and rights of shareholders flow from their providing "risk capital," that
directors shall manage the business, and that officers are agents of the corpora-
tion under the direction and control of the board and with a duty to manage the
corporation for the benefit of all the shareholders. None of these claims are true.
Shareholders do not provide most of the "risk capital;" directors do not direct;
and management has reversed the hierarchy of control.
Flynn, Corporate Democracy: Nice Work If You Can Get It, CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA
96 (1973).
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situation has almost completely reversed itself. . . . An over-
whelming majority [of American stockholders] . . . are "little
people," that is, members of the investing public who . . . know
little or nothing about corporate activities; whose advice is not
sought in running the corporation and probably would be worth
little if it were given. . . . [The stockholder] trusts implicitly to
the corporate management; his function is merely to
contribute.8"
In the early 1900's, corporate directors wielded near absolute
control over their business entities. 2 Unfettered by external re-
straints such as active shareholder participation or supervisory regu-
latory agencies, directors managed with virtually no duty to account
for their actions. Corporate corruption ran rampant as a result. In-
sider trading scams and fraudulent corporate reporting, designed to
entice purchases of bogus stock, became commonplace. 8 Finally, in
the early twenties, companies began to experiment with what one
critic terms "the crowning infamy of all," the issuance of non-voting
shares. 4 The corporation could easily deny the shareholder the right
to vote and thereby solidify its authority by issuing non-voting
shares. Several dramatically inequitable transactions occurred as a
result. For example, in 1925, Dillon Read and Company was able to
gain control of the $130 million Dodge Company through a well-
31. Berle, Stockholders: Their Rights and Duties, HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS ADMINIS-
TRATION 394, 374-75 (1931); see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 281 (1932) [hereinafter A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1932)].
[Tihe shareholder in the modern corporate situation has surrendered a set of
definite rights for a set of indefinite expectations .... Virtually all security
holders have two major expectations. They expect or hope to receive distribu-
tions as and when made , which ... will constitute a return on the capital they
have supplied .... They also expect that at some point they will be able to
secure a return of that capital.
A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1932) at 281.
32. See Loomis & Rubman, supra note 15, at 149.
33. The thrust of the problem clearly lay in the virtual nonexistence of disclosure
regulations thereby enabling management to overvalue assets or portray corpo-
rate activity in any way they desired. There are also several cases of excessive
remuneration being paid to officers and directors. One of the most egregious
examples cited by commentators involved the Bethlehem Steel Corporation
which paid corporate officers over $31 million in bonuses between 1917 and
1928 compared to less than $41 million received by shareholders for the same
period. In addition, several corporations enacted provisions in their corporate
charters that waived or released insiders from liability to the company for will-
ful or negligent misconduct.
Loomis & Rubman, supra note 15, at 150-51.
34. W. RIPLEY, supra note 28, at 72.
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crafted plan that involved an investment of only $2.25 million."5 The
vast majority of the shareholders found themselves handcuffed in op-
posing the transaction since their shares had no voting rights.
Meanwhile, overvalued stock saturated the market and director
self-dealing raged on out of control. 6 While state law regarding fi-
duciary duty outlawed much of this practice, the legal apparatus
needed to tame the situation simply did not exist.17 Finally, in 1926,
the New York Stock Exchange and the New York Curb condemned
the practice of disenfranchising the shareholder with non-voting
shares and refused to list companies that engaged in the practice. 38
The event marks the codification of the one-share, one-vote rule and
the beginning of the effort to regulate corporate abuse through
shareholder oversight. Unfortunately, the shareholder had long since
become an investor guided almost exclusively by profit potential.
Thus, the real origins of the arguments championing corporate de-
mocracy stem from a perception of the shareholder as an eager, in-
terested party. That shareholders have little or no interest in oversee-
ing and disciplining their corporation's management explains why
then, as now, the theory ultimately fails.
Significantly, the impetus to eradicate non-voting stock was ig-
nited by the furor and outrage of corporate directors' flagrant
abuse." Reformers simply compelled management to change by out-
lawing nonvoting stock. However, management quickly found other
conceptually similar arrangements to accomplish the same objective
of concentrated power. Soon, voting trusts emerged that enabled
management to consolidate a majority of the voting shares under the
guard of a single trustee.' The momentum behind the reform effort
35. A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1932), supra note 31, at 75-76; Seligman, supra note 6, at
694.
36. See, e.g., supra note 33; W. RIPLEY, supra note 28; A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1967),
supra note 22; H. SEAGER & C. GULICK, TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS (1929).
37. For a general discussion of state securities law prior to the federal regulations en-
acted in 1933 and 1934, see Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49
HARv. L. REV. 396 (1936); Mulvy, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37 (1916).
38. A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1932), supra note 31, at 76.
39. Loomis & Rubman, supra note 15, at 153 ("The demise of nonvoting common
resulted from outside pressure and outrage, not from a reformed consciousness on the part of
certain corporate managers.").
40. Voting trusts involve the creation of a group of trustees empowered with the author-
ity to vote all stock placed in a specific trust. The stock's owners therefore. do not vote their
shares but still receive disbursements according to normal procedure. Voting trusts are consid-
ered to be the most powerful devices available for separating control from the stock ownership.
Although often regulated by state law, such regulation has focused on limiting the duration of
trusts rather than prohibiting them altogether. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS (1967), supra note
22, at 73.
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quickly fizzled as shareholders, both private and institutional inves-
tors, remained indifferent to the activity of their respective boards.
After the ruins of the Depression, the thirties ushered in a pe-
riod of reform that would forever change corporate governance. The
widespread corruption of the twenties had played a key role in the
market's collapse, demanding that full disclosure requirements and
strict regulations be applied vigorously to any future transactions in-
volving a public entity's stock."' The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 followed this period of corruption,
and the Securities Exchange Commission was subsequently created
to write and interpret the panoply of rules authorized by the Acts. 2
In turn, the responsibility for policing corporate management gradu-
ally shifted into the hands of federal and state commissions which,
armed with a code of rules, assumed the role of overseer jettisoned by
shareholders. The judicial system facilitated the effort by fashioning
and enforcing doctrines such as the duty of care, duty of loyalty and
the business judgment rule to sabotage undesirable board practices.' 3
Significantly, those that masterminded the changes opted not to rely
on shareholder participation to curb managerial abuse, clearly sug-
gesting a recognition that shareholders lack both the capacity and
interest to assume the duty. Rule 14(a) of the 1934 Act stands as the
sole provision that attempts to bring shareholders into the govern-
ance fold. However, its limitations in terms of creating meaningful
access to the proxy system reveal its true colors as a largely symbolic
rule. Thus, the transformation was complete; the regulation of cor-
porate management would be a governmental function.
41. Much of the blame for the Depression fell on the shoulders of corporate manage-
ment who seemed to be a likely scapegoat. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933)
("[W]e cannot but believe that many recent disastrous events in the investment world would
not have taken place if those whose names have appeared as directors had known themselves to
be under a legal, as well as a moral, responsibility to the investing public.").
42. For a general overview of registration and disclosure requirements mandated by the
Acts, see L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION (1980). The birth of the SEC, it has been sug-
gested, was "an accident." The Federal Trade Commission appeared to be the likely candidate
for the role of enforcing securities regulations; however, Senator Carter Glass and opponents of
the Exchange Act feared that agency was overly saturated with aggressive New Deal reform-
ers. Thus, the push for the agency was inspired by the hope that it would be less effective.
This has not proved to be the case. J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET-A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 91-99 (1982).
43. New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926);
Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1940).
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A. The Shareholder of Today
Perhaps the most unfortunate repercussion of the securities laws
and regulations lies in the way they validate shareholder passivity.
The complex web of government regulation that ensnares public cor-
porations fosters a sense of security within shareholders that allows
them to remain oblivious to their corporate board's behavior. They
can afford to be indifferent because there are regulations that protect
their interests. As a result, from the 1930's to the 1980's, the pattern
of shareholder participation has varied little and never threatened to
significantly impact management. 44
In addition, like the stock buyer of the twenties, today's share-
holder purchases stock for investment purposes: profitability or se-
cure, long-term gain.' The authority to vote the purchased shares in
a meaningful way does not seem to weigh in the decision. Arguably,
holders of common stock have made a deliberate choice over other
investment products such as a company's preferred stock or a bond.
But the vote attached to a security is not necessarily its most alluring
feature in terms of attracting purchasers. Dividends paid to common
stock are not fixed, nor must its holder wait for a maturity date.
Shareholders are the residual claimants of the firm's assets and,
therefore, face no limitations on the amount they can receive if the
company's profits skyrocket. Thus, the present day shareholder gen-
erally purchases stock for investment purposes and anticipated re-
turn, not for the chance to voice a controlling interest.
Strong arguments have been put forth extolling the value of the
shareholder vote. Certainly, it serves an essential function in the gov-
ernance process by creating a tangible constituency empowered to act
when a corporation fails to meet its contractual obligations. Yet, that
44. For a discussion of the exceptions to this premise, see infra notes 55-59 and accom-
panying text.
45. Some commentators argue that the vast majority of shareholders "do not even de-
serve the right" to vote since their stock purchase, in the secondary market, does not contribute
"risk capital" to the corporate entity. Flynn, supra note 30, at 98. Today's stockholder does
not hold shares as an owner or entrepreneur. "Instead, they are investors in a huge crap game,
betting upon the ability of the holder of the die (management) to accumulate and expand their
holdings." Flynn, supra note 30, at 98.
In 1981, AMAX, Inc. attempted to give meaning to the term ownership by letting its
shareholders know exactly what each share was worth in terms of corporate assets. For each
share of common stock, the bulletin read, "you own" reserves of 53.6 tons of coal, 3.7 tons of
copper ore, 0.1278 tons of silver ore and so on through natural gas, potash, and tungsten.
Advertisement, Wall St. J., July 29, 1981, at 43, col. 3. But, as Professor Lowenstein notes,
"the shareholders of AMAX knew that no matter how valuable the real assets might be, they
did not own anything but their shares. They had bought their AMAX shares solely for re-
sale." Lowenstein, supra note 18, at 276.
[Vol. 28
DUAL CAPITALIZATION
type of authority has little value to anyone but a corporate insider or
a creditor on the open market. Indeed, securities are never advertised
through campaigns that highlight "residual value;" instead, profit
potential captures the most attention. The shareholder receives a vote
along with the stock purchase; however, undoubtedly the holder has
less interest and perhaps less authority to actually control the corpo-
ration than a creditor who might have contracted with the corpora-
tion and thereby retained the power to veto risky business ventures.
This analysis applies with equal veracity to both small-private
and large-institutional shareholders. The recent record-breaking ac-
tivity in the mutual funds market bolsters this theory.46 Mutual
funds signify the ultimate renouncement of any interest in corporate
control as the purchaser of such shares allows a group of money
managers to select and purchase stocks to achieve various pre-ex-
pressed investment goals. The mutual fund owns the shares on be-
half of their investors and buys and sells according to anticipated
fluctuations in the stock's price. The voting power of the shares is
rarely, if ever, exercised.47
Other institutional investors do not vote their shares as mean-
ingful owners because their concern lies in investment return.4 They
subscribe to the "Wall Street Rule," which calls upon the profes-
sional investor to sell rather than initiate change if dissatisfied with
management's performance. Often the funds comprising the holding
represent institutional reserves, generally pension plans or insurance
accounts.49 Those controlling the funds gravitate toward investments
that offer security, profitability or some blend of the two, but not for
the shares' voting strength. In fact, the corporation's perceived ability
to fulfill the investor's objectives will often be the determinative fac-
tor upon which the decision to invest turns.5" As one commentator
noted,
46. Statistics show the volume of mutual fund transactions has risen considerably in
recent years. Apparently, the explanation lies in the luxury the funds offer investors in that the
difficult decisions are made by an informed group. The investor seems to be attracted to invest-
ments that require little or no participation. See Small Investors Going to Mutual Funds,
Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 6.
47. T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS, Ch. XX, E § 19.1
(1980).
48. R. POZEN, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: INVESTMENT MANAGEMENTS 11 (1978).
49. Id. at 605-55.
50. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule
of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV 1, 26 (1970) ("the institutional investors
generally want shares only for the possibility of profit or return. They do not really want the
votes .. .").
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[there] are problems created by lodging the power and responsi-
bility for the selection and legitimation of corporate manage-
ment in the hands of [money managers] who have disclaimed
any interest in the election decision. The standard line of the
institutional manager is: 'We vote with the management. If we
don't like the management, we sell the stock.' . . . [T]his atti-
tude creates a rather large vacuum in the corporate election
process."1
Deliberate abstention, rather than pure apathy, sometimes ex-
plains the institutional investors' reluctance to vote the shares it
holds. During "campaign General Motors" in 1970, the General
Motors Board solicited proxies from its majority shareholders so that
management's response might reflect its owners' perspective of the
socially pregnant issue.2 Yale University, holder of 25,000 votes, re-
fused to vote on the proposal stating that "the Fellows of [Yale Uni-
versity] do not and should not have the power to take a corporate
position in issues of a political or social nature which do not directly
affect the university. . ... -" Regarding Yale's statement, one com-
mentator poignantly remarked,
[the] institutional investors that are amassing an increasing pro-
portion of the voting shares of major industrial companies, do
not want the votes that come with these shares if it requires
them to do anything other than make a decision on how best to
increase their investment return to meet their pressing financial
needs."'
B. The Nature of Shareholder Participation
While achieving corporate democracy through director-share-
holder synergy remains a fantastical ideal, certain events suggest that
shareholders do come forward when their interests are sufficiently
piqued. However, an analysis of that movement, facilitated by the
51. Ratner, supra note 50, at 26. But see STOLLER, SAVERIN & CUNNINGHAM, INSTI-
TUTIONAL OWNERSHIP: SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND REPORTING OF HOLDINGS, IN
SHAREHOLDER ACTIviSM 21 (1987).
52. STOLLER, SAVERIN & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 51 at 28. See Proxy Statement of
Campaign GM (Mar. 25, 1970). Campaign GM was initiated by the Project on Corporate
Responsibility, a Nader-affiliated organization. It consisted of nine resolutions for inclusion in
General Motors' proxy statement which proposed that the company take a more active role in
its own racial integration and generally be more responsive to progressive public policy.
53. N.Y. Times, May 11, 1970, at 27, col. 1; see also Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 425 (1983).
54. Ratner, supra note 50, at 29.
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proxy contest, various state laws, and Rule 14a-8 of the 1934 Act,55
reveals the limits of its significance in terms of indicating a trend
toward meaningful shareholder voting.
Rule 14a-8 encourages shareholder participation by sanctioning
their use of the proxy system to change corporate policy at the corpo-
ration's expense. The rule permits a qualified security holder "to
present a proposal for action at a forthcoming meeting of the issuer's
security holders."56 Termed the shareholder proposal rule, the provi-
sion attempts to promote shareholder democracy by requiring corpo-
rations to include its shareholders' ideas in distributed proxy materi-
als. Accordingly, several shareholders have ambitiously utilized Rule
14a-8 as an instrument for corporate change.57
Yet, statutory limitations severely restrict the subject matter that
shareholders are entitled to address in the proxies.5" Any proposal
relating to the conduct of the corporations ordinary business opera-
tion or elections to the board can be rejected by management pursu-
ant to Rule 14."s Consequently, the rule attracts proxies primarily
concerned with social issues and undesirable corporate activities.
Such proxies were more frequently filed in the late 1960's and early
1970's when Americans grew impatient with unbridled bureaucratic
abuse and directed their anger at big business. Dow Chemical Com-
pany faced a proxy from shareholders seeking to prohibit its chemi-
cal weapons division from producing armaments, and shareholders of
General Motors launched a campaign to compel its directors to more
actively pursue the company's racial integration." A large majority
55. Regulation 14A of the 1934 Act allows shareholders that meet a certain set of quali-
fications to have their proposal included within the corporation's proxy. It states, "[i]f any
security holder of an issuer notifies the issuer of his intention to present a proposal for action
at a forthcoming meeting of the issuer's security holders, the issuer shall set forth the proposal
in its proxy statement .. " 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8 (1986). Rule 14 of the 1934 Act also con-
tains the rules and regulations regarding proxies. See Loss, The SEC Proxy Rules and State
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1249 (1960).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1976).
57. Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 207 (6th Cir. 1984) (The court noted the
oddity of the rule in comparison with the other rules of the Act, stating that "Rule 14a-8
seems unrelated to prohibiting the inclusion of misleading or dishonest information in proxy
statements, which is the primary object of the statute.").
58. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW V 13.35
(1987). (Rule 14a-8(c)(8) provides for exclusion of a proposal which "relates to an election to
office.")
59. See Schwartz, Toward New Corporate Goals: Co-existence With Society, 60 GEO. L.
J. 57 (1971); Libeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV.
425 (1984).
60. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, 618-20 (3d ed. 1986); see generally Schwartz, The
Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1971).
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of shareholder proposals are voted down, and many are judicially
voided in their infancy." Others, like the General Motors campaign,
may have a long-term impact or at least result in highlighting the
issue for future debate.6 2
Opposing management's slate of directors, electing a different
set of directors, or otherwise probing into the corporation's by-laws
or operations requires a proxy filing under Rule 14d."3 The proce-
dure necessarily burdens the shareholder with a significant expense
in terms of both time and money. Disclosure requirements vary ac-
cording to state law and the particular focus of the proxy, but full
compliance often involves a substantial effort. Nonetheless, the proxy
offers the shareholder a vehicle for accessing corporate decisionmak-
ing and represents the most sound principle of corporate democracy
available in the federal statutes to date.
Several state laws permit shareholder involvement in addition to
that allowed by Rule 14.4 Delaware statutes, for example, authorize
shareholders to choose managers directly or through an elected board
of directors."0 Directors and managers serve full terms at the share-
holders' discretion and can be removed at any time for any reason.66
Clearly, the legal machinery surrounding corporations permits
shareholders, irrespective of the difficulties involved, to voice con-
cerns or attempt to implement some structural changes.
Whether or not the shareholder proposal, the proxy contest or
the various state statutes actually offer the shareholder a sufficient
instrument for participation remains an unresolved issue. The signif-
icance of these elements lies in the way they have not been used.
Although the cost and effort may or may not be the reason why only
the largest or wealthiest stockholders can consider the proxy alterna-
tive, the fact remains that corporate boards are not routinely faced
with challenges from shareholders.6 7 The analysis shows that share-
61. Shareholder proposals must relate in some capacity to the business' conduct or oper-
ations. Management can reject shareholder proposals that seek only to highlight political issues
that bear no relationship to the corporation. See generally Libeler, supra note 59.
62. FORBES, Apr. 15, 1976, at 40, 42 ("[W]inning the vote is not the main point. There
is also the publicity.").
63. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 58, at 1 13.10-13.34. For some exemptions, see
Rule 14a-2.
64. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 102-216 (1974); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT 11
15, 26, 32, 33, 39. Summaries of several states' voting provisions can be found in W. CARY &
M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 208-364 (1980).
65. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §§ 102(b)(1), 109(b), 141(a), 141(0 (1974).
66. Id. § 141(k).
67. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 346, 402
(1983). Shareholders do not have the incentives to become informed to vote intelligently be-
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holders do not attempt to make use of the proxy machinery available
to them. When they do, it is almost always a corporate raider en-
gaged in a proxy contest for personal gain, rather than for the bet-
terment of the corporation, or a shareholder proposal concerned
about a social issue.
Clearly these rules and regulations have neither galvanized the
interest of shareholders in voting their shares nor abated their apathy
in supervising management. In short, the ideal of the corporate de-
mocracy exists only in theory, as reflected in the behavior of both
shareholders and management alike.
III. THE NEW CORPORATE DEMOCRACY: THE HOSTILE
TENDER OFFER
A legion of factors concerning the circumstances and market
conditions of the 1970's accounts for the outbreak of the hostile
tender offer flurry."8 Cash tender offers had taken form in the
1960's, but since stock prices remained well above earnings, few
companies could afford the premium needed for a successful bid.69
By 1974, the sluggish market had pulled the aggregate price of many
stocks down to within five or six times that of their earnings.70 As
interest rates and construction costs soared, astute managers began to
acquire and merge rather than build." When the investment firm of
Morgan Stanley broke the long-standing "hands off" tradition re-
cause the cost to them to do so does not bring a proportional return in benefit. In fact, it makes
economic sense for most shareholders to remain passive.
68. The development of the cash tender offer had a particularly sharp impact on the
manner in which bidders approached takeovers. The growth of large pools of capital made
purchase-type takeovers of publicly-held corporations feasible. This practice began to attract
attention in the 1960's; however, mergers and acquisitions of that period predominantly oc-
curred as a result of negotiated transactions. Statistics indicate that over two-thirds of the
contested bids for corporate control in the 1960's were defeated. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics
of Cash Takeover Bids, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 137. It is generally agreed that
low stock prices and chronic inflation spurned the rapid spread of the hostile tender offer in
the 1970's. Cash became the most overvalued asset on the market and thus depressed shares
were readily snapped up. Hostile mergers became common. Total merger activity broke all-
time records for volume rising from about $12 billion in 1971 to $44 billion in 1979, and $82
billion in 1981 to more than $100 billion in 1984. See I. BOESKY, supra note 5, at 22.
69. See P. HOFFMAN, THE DEALMAKERS 143 (1984) ("Tender-offer raids themselves
were a symptom of the sagging market. During the go-go years of the 1960's, when stocks sold
for fifteen to twenty times earnings, few companies had the resources to offer thirty to forty for
another's shares.").
70. P. HOFFMAN, supra note 69, at 142. Whenever economic factors such as the oil
embargo of 1973 stall production, stock prices will drop and a corporation's liquidation value
may reach or even exceed it aggregate worth as reflected by its stock. Such corporations are
"ripe" for takeover. See I. BOESKY, supra note 5, at 80.
71. P. HOFFMAN, supra note 69, at 143.
1988]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
garding tender offers embraced by most law firms and brokerage
houses, the wildfire began.7"
The hostile takeover mania that continues to stir the financial
community has completely transformed traditional corporate meth-
ods and operations. 75  Corporate raiders work quickly, identifying
undervalued companies and then purchasing its stock by offering a
premium above market value. Before management can rally a de-
fense, the raider owns a controlling interest and votes the board
out.74 Herein lies the significance of the hostile tender offer in terms
of corporate democracy. Although the corporation issued voting stock
for years without fanfare or response from shareholders, suddenly
these raiders, the new holders of the corporation's stock, are exercis-
ing the attached voting right and ousting management.7 5 In a techni-
cal sense, since the shares are voted and their holder is possessed of
an interest in manipulating the business' disposition, corporate de-
mocracy is at work. Of course, corporate democracy ideally envisions
shareholders participating for the betterment of the corporate entity.
The hostile bidder's motivation usually involves self profit at the ex-
pense, or even demise, of the company. Clearly, it is not corporate
democracy in its fullest glory. Nonetheless, the transactions involve
the owners of stock exercising their right to influence and even
change management. That democratic process, even if it is a distor-
tion in the given circumstances, has never really occurred before. So,
as raiders continue to hunt for corporations, management shudders
at the new meaning of shareholder voting.
The Williams Act set out a package of guidelines to regulate
72. P. HOFFMAN, supra note 69, at 142. (The blue-chip law firms and investment
banks maintained the "old school's gentlemanly hands off policy" toward advising raiders on
hostile bids until Robert F. Greenhill took over Morgan Stanley's mergers-and-acquisitions
department. In 1974, Greenhill helped International Nickel of Canada takeover EBS Inc., a
Philadelphia battery maker and the "stampede started.").
73. The threat of hostile takeover and the use of anti-takeover provisions has caused
significant problems for the judicial system as well. The judicial system must grapple with the
difficult task of evaluating management decision-making and has encountered several problems
in articulating a clear set of guidelines. See Matheson & Norberg, supra note 1, at 415.
74. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OF-
FERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1977). Takeovers are motivated by a variety of factors.
Sometimes ego or machoism allowance is sufficient. See generally Coffee, supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
75. There are basically two types of bidders executing a hostile tender offer. One, the
individual raider, usually seeks to acquire the corporation for its liquidation value. The other,
the corporate entity, seeks a merger to strengthen its position or increase its size. In both cases,
existing management must be removed. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 18 and accom-
panying text.
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the tender offer practice. 76 However, determined bidders with crea-
tive schemes quickly devised new and innovative approaches to suc-
ceed in the spree for corporate control. 77 Invariably, their plans envi-
sioned the restructuring of the target's corporate management by
voting the shares that wield that control. One of the more devastating
techniques employed by raiders involves a "two-tier" or front-loaded
offer whereby an offer for 51 percent of the target's voting stock is
extended to shareholders. Once the raider acquires the 51 percent
threshold, the offer expires. The raider then uses the controlling
votes to force either a merger, commonly known as a "bear hug," or
management out-through a much less expensive exchange of
stock. 78 The technique gives a substantial advantage to the raider
since it minimizes the needed initial cash outlay and achieves more
quickly the goal of takeover.
The problem acquires a more troubling dimension for corporate
management as creative mechanisms for financing these transactions
flood the market. "Junk bonds," high-risk subordinated debt, enable
a wise raider bolstered by an aggressive investment banker to wrest
control of a multi-million dollar corporation from the hands of its
management. 79 Clearly, the hostile battle for corporate control seems
to be stacked against management.80
While the Williams Act has been amended to restrict the two-
tier tender offer, the nature of the corporate structure continues to
fuel the raider's success. 8 ' The raider in possession of a large block
of a corporation's stock has discovered the spectacular power that
inures to him through the possession of voting rights. For the first
time, shareholder democracy has found a basis in that the share-
holder has exercised his right to vote. Unfortunately for manage-
ment, that process has worked an abrupt and violent change on
traditional modes of merger and acquisitions dealmaking, almost
completely removing them from the negotiations equation.
Frequently, a target's shareholders welcome the hostile bidder
76. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
77. Cash was the primary instrument used to complete deals in the 1970's. But ex-
change deals are now much more common whereby the aggressor offers a package of securities
or an equity interest in itself or its subsidiaries in lieu of cash for the target's stock. R. HAMIL-
TON, supra note 60, at 787.
78. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
79. See Carney, Junk Bonds, supra note 17, at 18, col. 3.
80. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 18; Coffee, supra note 16.
81. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1977).
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because the price of the stock invariably rises.8 2 The shareholder, it
will be recalled, generally prefers the quick return of profit to the
intangible security and benefits that come from having a solid group
of managers at the corporation's helm.8" Shareholders stand to gain
even more if management engages in a bidding war or attracts other
equally eager third parties into the fray.84 Meanwhile, the corporate
entity necessarily suffers since management invariably bogs down in
defensive posturing and becomes distracted from the main task of
managing. Shareholders who tender at the inappropriate time or not
at all may also suffer.85 But the process of the hostile takeover has
emphatically changed both the meaning and significance of the
shareholders' right to vote.
One illustration of this change can be more closely examined by
analyzing the recent restructuring events of Union Carbide. The
price of that corporation's stock hit rock bottom after a chemical spill
at its Bhopal, India facility immersed the company in a jungle of
major lawsuits.86 Three different arbitragers moved in, quickly buy-
ing up shares of Union Carbide stock at bargain rates.87 The com-
pany and its stock price subsequently rebounded, but thirty percent
of its shares remained in unfriendly hands. Since the new sharehold-
ers were "out to make money fast," management was distracted and
could not remain focused on the corporation's business.88 As a result,
management initiated an elaborate restructuring and repurchasing
plan designed to bring that stock back into the fold of friendly con-
trol. The restructuring will be felt by Union Carbide for years to
come since it "shrinks the company, raises dust and changes Car-
bide's overall strategy." '89 Nonetheless, the disposition of the com-
82. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Rule of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
83. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
84. Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be Stopped?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271, 1275
(1986).
85. See Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1720-23 (1985) (shareholders often face'a prisoner's
dilemma-type choice).
86. Union Carbide's Destiny Shaped by the Changing Nature of its Holders, Wall. St.
J., Jan. 7, 1986, at 2, col. 4.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 18, col. 2. (The paragraph continues: "But those aren't [the arbitrager's] con-
cerns. Within a month or two he expects to be out of Union Carbide and looking for new
takeover stocks." Id. The sentence underscores the poignancy of the problem management
confronts when voting rights designed for shareholders concerned with the corporation's best
interest fall into the hands of those motivated solely by personal gain. The shareholder concept
came about to help corporations run more lucratively, not the other way around.)
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pany's shareholders mandated the move. Management recognized
that its new shareholders wanted quick profits and responded by is-
suing them accordingly. The alternative would have been devastat-
ing: the arbitragers would sell to a hostile bidder who would liqui-
date a majority of Carbide's holdings and otherwise create traumatic
change. Thus, the shareholders' threat to vote forced management to
radically alter its corporate strategy.
Whether the tender offer benefits corporate America, sharehold-
ers and society as a whole is uncertain.90 However, the practical ef-
fect of the raider's presence has clearly precipitated some fundamen-
tal changes in traditional corporate structure.9' The erstwhile
meaningless vote attached to an issued share has acquired tremen-
dous potency in the hands of the bidder or arbitrager. For the first
time in history, the ideal of shareholder participation, of corporate
democracy, has become a reality. Unfortunately, it is not a democ-
racy imbued with endearing notions of equity and shared-effort. In-
stead, it more closely resembles a crafty manipulation of a system
that was never intended to be used in that manner.
IV. MANAGEMENT FIGHTS BACK: DEFENSIVE TACTICS
In response to the tender offer crunch, management seized upon
whatever takeover defense it could find to rebuff the raider.9" Over a
decade has passed since that process began, and corporate counsel,
now thoroughly skilled in the practice, has saturated the market with
various anti-takeover devices.9" The early "shark repellents" and
''poison pills" often reflected a rudimentary approach to solving the
problem. Invariably the plans envisioned some deliberate harm to the
corporation, thereby rendering it a less attractive target for a raider
to ingest.94 Corporations would take on substantial debt or acquire
90. For a thorough analysis of the arguments for tender offers, see Bebchuk, Facilitat-
ing, supra note 9; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9; Gilson, Structural Approach, supra
note 9; Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellant Amendments: Structural Limitations on
the Enabling Concepts, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982). For a critical view of takeovers, see
Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 687 (1978);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW.
1017 (1981).
91. See generally Coffee, supra note 16.
92. SHARK REPELLANTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITION-
ERS §§ 395-422 (1986) (R. Winter, M. Stumpf & G. Hawkins eds.) (While anti-takeover
provisions were occasionally found in corporate charters prior to the advent of the hostile
tender, their use became widespread only after that phenomenon began.).
93. Id.
94. Gilson, Shark Repellant, supra note 90, at 776.
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new entities to trigger antitrust problems for the bidding corpora-
tion.95 Other techniques involve selling off the target's prime asset or
incorporating "flip in" provisions that permit target holders to auto-
matically acquire a controlling interest in the merging corporation."'
However, all these tactics seem to suffer conceptually as a true de-
fense to potential raiders, since they are virtually inapplicable until
the takeover begins. Like an enjailed secret agent who chooses cya-
nide over a tortuous interrogation by his enemy (ergo the term
"poison pill"), the plans lack deterrent value.97 In that alone, these
formulas are flawed. In addition, when successful they frequently
cause sizable harm to the corporation from which it often takes years
to recover.
The inherent conflict of interest faced by management in fight-
ing any takeover attempt raises other significant questions. Manage-
ment's concentrated effort on a strong defense necessarily distracts it
from the more important task of proper management.9" Moreover,
the battle will no doubt be costly for the corporation, especially if
greenmail or self tender becomes an option. 99
Management must trod carefully in this area, always aware of
their duty to account for their actions. Courts have entertained
shareholders' derivative suits brought against managers who squan-
dered corporate assets to retain control.1 ° Accordingly, some com-
mentators have argued that the proper function for managers con-
95. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 379. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18(1982), generally prohibits stock acquisitions "where in any line of commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." Id. See, e.g., Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Tech., Corp., 435 F.
Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
96. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. "Poison Pill" rights plans are fully de-
scribed in SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 92, at 4.
97. See Gilson, supra note 90, at 775-79 (arguing that only those shark repellants
which actually amend the corporation's by-laws have actual deterrent effect; other anti-take-
over provisions are either detrimental or inexpedient).
98. See generally Lipton, supra note 90.
99. Greenmail refers to the target's repurchase of shares held by a hostile bidder at an
above average price. Self tender involves management's buy back or bidding for its own shares.
Both transactions are costly in terms of corporate expenditures. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950 (Del. 1985) (discretionary self tender requires the target to incur
enormous debt).
100. Such actions are brought on a breach of duty theory. Courts have applied the busi-
ness judgment rule which requires the director to prove the defensive actions were fair and
reasonable to the corporation. It has not been difficult for directors to avoid liability under this
standard. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Treadway Companies v. Care Corp., 638
F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); see also D. DEMoTr, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE AcTIONs L. & PRAC. § 4.03
(1986).
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fronted with hostile bidders is total passivity. Even though the
business judgment rule will vindicate all but the most flagrant defen-
sive tactics, the war for corporate control remains ugly.1"1
In turn, management has begun to rethink defensive strategy.
The rapid spread of "golden parachutes," whereby top management
receives lucrative severance pay guarantees in the event of their dis-
placement, marks the first signs of the new defense tactic.1 " This
more logical approach addresses the mechanics of the tender offer
and specifically converges on that aspect which allows the takeover to
6ccur-namely, a raider's acquisition of enough stock to vote man-
agement out. Poison pills have made headway in that respect; but a
more potent formula might yield better results. In concentrating on
the dynamics of voting share consolidation, dual class capitalization
has emerged, engrossing management because of its piercing focus on
the source of their problem. 03
It is important to note that the practice of dual class capitaliza-
tion is, at best, currently on probation. The New York Stock Ex-
change refuses to list firms with dual class comnmon stocks, preferring
instead the one-share, one-vote rule discussed below. 0 4 But the Ex-
change has recently reconsidered its position."0 Recognizing that
"[m]any of the Exchange's requirements were designed in a time
when unnegotiated offers for securities of an issuer were virtually
unknown," the Exchange has discontinued the practice of delisting
firms that implement dual capitalization schemes.1 6 This change has
been partially fueled by competition the Exchange feels from both
the American Stock Exchange and the National Association of Se-
curities dealers who trade on the NASDAQ, both of which reject the
one-share, one-vote listing requirement. 0 7 Thus, dual class capitali-
101. See generally Comment, Business Judgment Rule: A Benchmark for Evaluating
Defensive Tactics in the Storm of Hostile Takeovers, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1429 (1986).
102. SHARK REPELLANTS, supra note 92, at § 425; N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED
COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00 (1985); compare AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY
GUIDE 122 (1985).
103. See supra notes 6, 10 and accompanying text.
104. N. Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, INITIAL REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SHARE-
HOLDER PARTICIPATION AND QUALITATIVE LISTING STANDARDS, DUAL CLASS CAPITALI-
ZATION 2, 3 (1987) ("The onset of tender offers has caused a wide-ranging re-examination of
many accepted legal doctrines when shareholders are provided which extensive and meticu-
lously regulated information . . . and then vote for such recapitalizations, the Exchange
should penalize them . . . by denying them the benefits of an Exchange listing.") [hereinafter
INITIAL REPORT].
105. 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 389 (Mar. 21, 1986).
106. See INITIAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 2-3.
107. See INITIAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 2-3.
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zation appears to be headed for a busy future.
A. Dual Class Capitalization
The prototype dual class recapitalization involves the reclassifi-
cation of the corporation's outstanding shares into two classes that
have disproportionate rights in voting."' 8 The recapitalization creates
a new class, commonly known as class B common, which is allocated
ten or more votes per share. The outstanding common, now-termed
class A common, retains its one vote per share. The class A shares
can be freely transferred and their holders retain a normal dividend
preference. Conversely, the class B common shares cannot be pub-
licly traded and carry an inferior right to dividends. After the reclas-
sification, but for a limited period, the holders of class A are permit-
ted to exchange for shares of class B. Since the process involves an
amendment to the corporation's certificate of incorporation, share-
holder approval must be obtained.' 0 '
The concentration of voting power occurs over time. Generally,
management and select white knights will exchange all their hold-
ings for class B while other investors retain their class A for its divi-
dend and transferability features. The class B may always be ten-
dered for class A on a share-for-share basis so that shareholders who
initially exchanged will not be locked into the restricted shares. Any
other transfer of class B will be prohibited or will automatically con-
vert that stock into class A. Thus, as the system operates, class B
shares gradually flow into the hands of management while outside
investors amass the class A shares. In turn, management stymies the
corporate raider by accumulating the stock empowered with superior
voting rights that ensures continued control. Meanwhile, the holders
of class A continue to receive dividends and remain free to trade
their shares." 0
Recapitalization can be implemented in any variety of ways, but
the ultimate objective remains constant: concentration of voting con-
trol.1 ' The result secures management's position without visiting
108. For a general overview of the mechanics of dual class capitalization, see J. SELIG-
MAN, THE ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE CONTROVERSY 11-13 (1986).
109. Statistical data compiled and analyzed by De Angelo & Rice indicates that share-
holders routinely approve such amendments in spite of the detrimental implications for them
as a whole. They assert that even "informed" investors find little value in opposing a manage-
ment anti-takeover plan. DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 11 J. or Fi-
NANCIAL ECON. 329, 334 (1983).
110. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 12.
111. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 12.
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any significant hardship upon the corporation's reserves or share-
holders."' The Wang Laboratories recapitalization in 1976 illus-
trates the mechanics of a typical plan.
Wang issued a dividend of one share of class B common for
every four of its outstanding shares.1 ' The class B paid a higher
dividend per share and entitled its holders to elect twenty-five per-
cent of the company's board.11' The remaining directors were elected
by the holders of the common, or class A stock. On all other matters
outside of the election of management, both groups of holders vote
together, with class B having one-tenth of one vote per share and
class A one full vote.11 The plan neither restricted the transferabil-
ity of either class nor imposed an automatic conversion requirement.
Subsequently, Wang amended the plan to require that any
merger or consolidation must be approved by two-thirds of the class
A and class B shares voting together as well as each class of stock
voting separately. 6 In effect, the amendment precludes a merger or
.consolidation unless such a proposal receives three separate approv-
als. Since Wang's family owned 73.8 percent of the class A common,
it had final veto power over any change in management even though
the class B stock represents 95 percent of the company's value. 17
The Dow Jones and Company's recapitalization in 1984 pro-
vides another enlightening example. That transaction involved the
dividend issuance of one share of newly-created class B stock for
every two outstanding shares of common, or class A.11 Both shares
have equal rights to dividends and other distributions, but each class
B share has the power of ten votes. Class B stock, however, cannot
be transferred to any outsiders, although it can be used to redeem
unrestricted common class A shares at a rate of one to one. 1 ' There-
fore, as shareholders begin to trade their holdings, they will convert
their class B shares for class A shares. Eventually, management will
hold all the potent class B shares and control the election of the
board, in spite of the fact that its holding represents a fraction of the
company's initial capitalization.
112. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 12.
113. Wang Laboratories, Proxy Statement (Mar. 12, 1976); Wang Laboratories, Proxy
Statement (Sept. 16, 1985).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Wang Laboratories, Inc., Proxy Statement (Sept. 16, 1985).
117. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 11.
118. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 11.
119. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 11. Numerous other examples of dual class re-
capitalizations are also recorded. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 12-15.
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B. Shareholder Voting Comes Full Circle
These various manifestations of dual class capitalization design-
edly share the common objective of neutralizing the shareholders'
voting power. An issuance of stock no longer endows its holder with
a permissive right to participate in the corporation's politics. Instead,
the instruments of control shift into the hands of management, and
the masquerade of corporate democracy is forever castaway as a de-
sired goal. In causing that effect, dual class capitalization furnishes
management with its much-needed elixir. However, such a coup
cannot be won without a fight, and opponents of restricted voting
shares are prepared for battle. 20
Such an emphatic transfer of corporate control raises obvious
concerns regarding the protection of shareholders' interests and the
supervision of management. By far the most troubling scenario pic-
tures management exploiting its freedom to govern without a constit-
uency and thereby tumbling the corporation into bankruptcy or out
of existence. Shareholders would be powerless to vote management
out or influence their decision-making unless some evidence of fraud
or gross negligence was apparent.' As the price of the stock plum-
meted, shareholders' only recourse would be to sell their shares on
the open market. Yet, as gruesome as it sounds, that remedy does not
appear to be entirely inadequate. In fact, any group of shareholders
from a traditionally capitalized corporation would probably respond
in the same fashion. In other words, even those shareholders pos-
sessed with the right to vote out slothful or unwanted management
will not do so given the choice between that and liquidating the in-
terest in the market. Indeed, the shareholder is an investor who, as
the above analysis has demonstrated, shirks the duty of monitoring
management. 122
Herein lies the roots of the full circle analysis. Although dual
class recapitalization actually sifts the voting power out of stock, that
voting power has a history of not being used by its holder, thus sug-
gesting that its disappearance will not be noticed, or at least not ex-
cessively mourned. The practical effect of this recapitalization proce-
dure engenders no significant change in the way most shareholders
120. T. Boone Pickens, a noted player in the market for corporate control has vocifer-
ously criticized the dual class capitalization procedure and is generally considered the spokes-
person for the campaign against it. See Pickens, Second Class Stock Impairs Market, Wall St.
J. Feb. 13, 1986, at 30, col. 3.
121. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 58, at 11.02-11.25 for a discussion of the
fraudulent sections that give shareholders a cause of action against directors.
122. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
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will behave. Of course, the hostile bidders will suffer, because they
did purchase the stock for its voting power. But the hostile bidder
represents the new force that subverts the traditional meaning and
nature of shareholder voting in the first place. Since the bidder's in-
tent is generally to profit at the expense and detriment of the com-
pany, his interests are perceived as not warranting protection as a
typical shareholder.
C. Shareholder Protection
Disenfranchising shareholders from their votes is not without its
problems. The above analysis shows that dual class capitalization in-
hibits voting behavior only to the extent that it involves ousting man-
agement in a takeover scheme. Yet, even if identifying the dynamics
of the process helps to justify or encourage its use, there are other
strong shareholder considerations militating against it that must be
addressed.
It may be recalled that those who champion the ideal of the
corporate democracy, aside from the raiders, do so for two primary
reasons: (1) shareholder participation compels directors to manage
profitably and honestly; and (2) it allows shareholders, the ostensi-
ble, true owners, to voice concerns about the nature and type of busi-
ness in which the corporation engages."' 8 While these internal re-
straints on management seem to evaporate under the dual class
scheme, they are somewhat supplanted by other external pressures
that operate to accomplish the same objectives, at least in terms of
deterring fraud.
The more formidable external restraints, at least for overseeing
management, are the SEC, state and federal anti-fraud statutes, and
the requirements of the stock exchanges themselves."' The conjunc-
tive efforts of these bodies, although not always coordinated, success-
fully minimize the incidence of managerial abuse, fraud and misrep-
resentation. In fact, as discussed earlier, these agencies have taken
the responsibility upon themselves recognizing shareholders' inability
to perform the same task adequately. Finally, corporate law provides
even non-voting shareholders with ammunition to attack a destruc-
tive board. The business judgment rule, various duties of care, and
123. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also Ratner, supra note 50.
124. For an indepth examination of the SEC's enforcement techniques and operation,
see M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 13-31 (1983). Of the three Exchanges,
the NYSE maintains the most comprehensive set of requirements and listing prerequisites.
N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL (1985).
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the shareholder derivative suit are examples of doctrines that protect
non-voting shareholders from a corrupt management. 125 Thus, the
external pressures that engulf corporate management provide an ad-
equate, perhaps more efficient, substitute for the check otherwise in-
herent in the shareholder vote.
D. Passive Shareholder Pressure
In terms of holding management accountable for the corpora-
tion's profitability and efficiency, the problems are more genuine and
not easily dismissed. Most companies employ independent directors
who govern from a "disinterested" perspective. 2 Ostensibly they
help to ensure a certain quality of managerial performance. Inde-
pendent audit committees are also routinely used to prepare and re-
view the company's financial records.1 27 These devices, however, ap-
pear to be very limited in their ability to motivate or compel
directors to manage efficiently. Of course, most management com-
pensation structures tie salary to performance. 121 Moreover, the
manager associated with a failed effort or a bankrupt company will
undoubtedly suffer tremendously in terms of damaged reputation.
Nonetheless, the external pressures rooted in corporate law that are
calculated to ensure managerial efficiency do not necessarily replace
the naturally occurring pressure or power housed in the sharehold-
ers' vote.
According to the full circle analysis, rendering the shareholder
impotent should not affect governance since the votes they hold are
rarely exercised. However, the intangible passive pressure that ema-
nates from thousands of uncast or outstanding votes impacts manage-
ment in a way that is difficult to quantify. Some have argued that
every action or decision made by a corporate board anticipates the
shareholders' likely response. 29 If shareholders remain passive and
continually accede to management's proposals, that represents a sign
of approval of a job correctly done. Conversely, if management's di-
rection goes askew and the corporation suffers, shareholders will ac-
125. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Examples of other "monitoring" systems
include sales of securities through investment bankers and retention of third party accountants.
See Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1986).
126. Most outside directors, however, are selected by internal managers. See Fama &
Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301, 318 (1983).
127. Id.
128. R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS (1986).
129. See Fama & Jensen, supra note 126, at 303-07.
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tivate their voting rights and implement changes. That this does not
happen frequently, if at all, is testimony to the performance of cor-
porate America's boards of directors.
Certainly the passive pressure that management faces from dor-
mant votes plays some role in their decision-making process. It is
significant to the full circle analysis in that it highlights a critical
difference between the nature of shareholder voting before the hostile
bidder impacted the meaning of voting and that supposed nature af-
ter the implementation of dual class capitalization. In the latter situ-
ation, the shareholder is completely disenfranchised. Therefore,
while dual class capitalization may return shareholder voting to its
old status, a perhaps crucial component, the dormant power of the
vote, is removed from the equation.
E. Shareholder Plans
The primary objective of dual capitalization lies in keeping vot-
ing control over management away from raiders. 30 The effect the
plan levies upon the corporate structure and the extent to which
shareholders will be disadvantaged obviously must be weighed in
fashioning its contours. Thus, shareholder rights plans 'have recently
surged in popularity because they avoid any structural changes in
the corporation's infrastructure until a certain specific threat devel-
ops.'s' In essence, they accomplish the same objective as dual class
capitalization without disenfranchising the shareholder.
One such type of plan places a "threshold limitation" on the
number of shares any one entity can own for purposes of mandating
large transactions such as a merger or consolidation.' MCI em-
ploys such a plan. Once any owner acquires ten percent or more of
the corporation's stock, each additional share in his possession carries
130. Dual class capitalization has been used for other purposes than defense in recent
years. General Motors, for example, has twice in the past two years issued "alphabet" stock
representing interests in non-automatic subsidiaries acquired by the company. The new classes
have dividend preferences but unequal voting rights and are distributed to employees and man-
agement of subsidiaries. Thus, the recapitalization is not a defense but a form of incentive
compensation program, or profit sharing 'scheme, that inspires employees to boost their compa-
nies' profits. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 12-13.
131. These shareholder plans must be distinguished from the basic poison pill provisions
discussed previously. While poison pills operate in a similar fashion, they activate target share-
holders' rights in or to the acquiring entity, not voting rights. Poison pills aim at making the
takeover an unattractive option for the bidder while these plans specifically empower the
shareholders to prevent it. These plans are not dual class recapitalizations in the true sense
since they do not create a second class of stock. Nonetheless, the plans cap the voting power of
large shareholders and thus fall into the recapitalization analysis.
132. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 14-15.
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only 1/100th of a vote.188 Shareholders enjoy participatory rights
consonant with traditional governance models, provided they are not
bent on monopolizing the corporation's voting stock. Thus, the plan
harmonizes the ideal of protecting shareholder access with the com-
peting goal of preventing hostile takeovers.
Another more frequently used plan involves issuing each ex-
isting shareholder a "preferred stock purchase right." The right, as
in the plan used by the Tyler Corporation, enables the holder to buy
1/100th of a preferred share for $50.00.'" A preferred share is
equivalent to 100 common shares in voting rights, value and divi-
dends. 86 Accordingly, the rights will be exercisable only in the event
that one shareholder or entity acquires twenty percent or more of the
company's common stock or makes a tender offer for thirty percent
or more.' Reaching those thresholds triggers the stock's supervoting
power and effectively precludes the hostile bidder from acquiring the
voting strength to compel a restructuring.
The recurrent theme that can be extrapolated from these vari-
ous plans is management's need to insulate its outstanding voting
shares from stalking hostile bidders. Significantly, these plans are not
ploys to forever engrave management's philosophy and form of gov-
ernance on the corporation.' 87 Instead, they represent a deliberate
effort to redress the enormous problems that have materialized as a
result of the hostile bidder's exercising the right to vote. The aim of
the plans focus on limiting the share's voting power with respect to
mergers, consolidation and the election of the board.' 38 Clearly, the
purpose lies in obviating management's need to entertain costly de-
fensive strategies every time a raider hones in.
But, at whose expense are these plans being erected? It appears
that those shareholders disadvantaged by these related plans are a
much smaller group than those potentially harmed by a full blown
dual class recapitalization-namely, those holding the shares to spe-
cifically vote out management to secure control or, more specifically,
133. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 108, at 14-15.
134. Holder Rights Plan Adopted to Ward off Takeover Bids, Wail St. J., Nov. 24,
1987, at 4, col. 4.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. The "managerial entrenchment hypothesis" holds that antitakeover amendments,
like dual class recapitalization, primarily operate to increase incumbent management's job pro-
tection and decision-making prerogatives at the expense of shareholders. It is often used to
substantiate arguments against tender offer regulation. See supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
138. See supra notes 108-25 and accompanying text.
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the corporate raiders and hostile bidders.1 9 Other stockholders, it
will be recalled, are investors that do not purchase shares for voting
rights and consistently abstain or accede to management in all mat-
ters relating to governance. Yet, they nonetheless retain their voting
rights and are encouraged to participate under this type of plan. Of
course, it can be persuasively argued that raiders spark drastic jumps
in the price of stock and thereby benefit shareholders as a whole.140
While such arguments may have merit, the focus of this analysis is
upon the shareholders of the corporation and the extent to which the
flourishing of recapitalization schemes impact them."" That analysis
reveals that shareholder plans do not seriously jeopardize sharehold-
ers' rights since they do not foreclose shareholders from voting or
otherwise participating in corporate affairs. In turn, the plans' re-
strictions on voting rights do not practically affect shareholders or
their interests as a group. Only the corporate raider who actually
uses the vote to dislodge management is truly disadvantaged by the
restructuring. Therefore, whether or not dual class capitalization
presents corporate America with a favorable change depends on
one's cost benefit analysis of tender offers as a whole. This analysis,
however, has demonstrated that the new defensive tactic, by neutral-
izing the bidder, merely returns shareholder voting to the symbolic
status it enjoyed prior to the hostile tender offer deluge without sig-
nificantly endangering shareholder rights in the process.
Due to the growing awareness of this analysis, critics of these
defensive plans are finding their counter arguments increasingly nar-
rowed. Indeed, the most recent shareholder plans that leave the cor-
porate structure completely unmarred until a bidder activates the
supervoting defense", 2 have almost totally refuted the assertion that
the adopted plans trammel shareholders' rights. Instead, the reality
is exposed: corporate raiders lose their ability to orchestrate take-
overs. Subsequent debate should be focused accordingly.
139. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
140. See generally supra note 9. Again, these are the leading arguments of those that
advocate a restriction-free market for corporate control.
141. The analysis of this article deliberately avoids the pro/con analysis of dual capitali-
zation and does not seek to express an opinion in that regard. For an article that does under-
take such a theme, see Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Com-
mon Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (1987). See also J. SELIGMAN, supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Targeted boards seem to embattle hostile raiders on every front
in the current war for corporate control. Even the most prolific man-
agers fear overthrow from bidders who deal in mergers, acquisitions,
or worse, the assets of a dismantled company. So dual class recapital-
ization has surfaced as a powerful defensive weapon. The process
immunizes corporate boards from foraging raiders by sterilizing the
voting power of the company's outstanding common stock. The re-
sulting structure of the company precludes the possibility of takeover.
As a remedy, however, dual class capitalization seems to go too
far since all shareholders are completely shut out of the participation
process. Its critics are up in arms over this shifting of control and
portend a return to the helter skelter of the twenties if it is permitted
to continue.48 However, the dual class capitalization schemes that
have recently captured so much attention can be distinguished from
the scams that flourished years ago. The backdrop of today's recapi-
talizations looks entirely different in comparison to the corrupt mar-
ket of decades past. External regulatory checks are woven into the
system and perform the management monitoring task, at least in
terms of inhibiting fraud, adequately.""
In addition, the separation of corporate ownership from control
has long ago matured into an accepted and basic principle of corpo-
rate law in America. While dual class capitalization might properly
be described as the coup de grace to that enduring tug of war, the
rift between the two has drifted far past the point of mending. The
disenfranchised shareholder, or at least the passive investor, stands
more readily as a portrait of the corporate owner than the fictional
participant of the corporate democracy. Therefore, the practical ef-
fect of dual class capitalization, depriving shareholders of their right
to vote, will cause little consternation since shareholder voting has
always been meaningless, with the exception of the hostile bidder's
brief tango.
On the other hand, proponents of dual class capitalization can-
not reasonably win their case on the full circle analysis alone. That
the shareholder traditionally does not exercise the right to vote does
not necessarily justify its elimination. Indeed, imagine the outcry if a
state attempted to eradicate public elections merely because voter
turnout was repeatedly very low. The pressure that uncast votes pas-
sively impress upon delegates is difficult to qualify, but it does ex-
143. See supra notes 34-39, 120 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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ist. ' 5 Since directors shape corporate policy with the shareholder in
mind to some extent, removing that dormant force as a factor for
them to consider is tantamount to sanctioning their unfettered
control.
What corporate governance needs lies somewhere between the
strict one-share, one-vote model and the dual class capitalization
scheme. A more balanced approach preserves the constituency ingre-
dient that is so attractive in the shareholder voting formula while
simultaneously erecting a barrier to the hostile advances of a raider.
The shareholder plans seem to capture both of these ideals. Under
such a plan, management maintains a traditional governance model
until a triggering event, such as a hostile bidder's attack, activates
the shield. Only then are voting rights diluted and often only those of
the bidder. Corporate democracy and passive shareholder pressure
survive under these plans, yet they also deter the raider. In that re-
spect, they represent the ideal balance or compromise.
145. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 406-
08 (1983).
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